The live trust posture of this Frame instance: the measured enclave it runs
in, the image measurement (PCR0) a bank pins, and the identity that gates operational-seed
release. Read live from this service — nothing here is fabricated; the measurement shown is the
one the enclave itself attested.
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Measured identity
Status
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What this proves
The policy engine runs inside a measured Trusted Execution Environment. A
bank does not trust Frame's operators — it pins two values out of band and checks everything
against them: the enclave measurement (PCR0) and the trust root (K_root).
Attestation-gated seed release (INV5). The operational seed is wrapped so AWS KMS
releases it only to an enclave whose attestation carries this exact PCR0. The
untrusted parent host — which holds the AWS credentials — cannot decrypt it: KMS denies
kms:Decrypt without a matching attestation.
The measurement is reproducible. Rebuild the enclave image from source and you get
the same PCR0 shown here — so anyone can confirm what code the measurement stands for.
Verify a settlement yourself. Every settlement produces a verify-pack you can
recompute in your own browser or with the offline CLI — open the
verifier →